Abstract:
3

Introduction
49
Does the Mona Lisa face left or right? A common method of solving this problem is to 50
form an image of the Da Vinci painting in your 'mind's eye'. Our ability to imagine scenes 51 and objects can help us solve everyday problems and accomplish day-to-day tasks, such 52 as retracing our steps to find a lost item or navigating from a memorised map. These 53 mentally-generated images are formed in the absence of visual information, and are instead 54 based on short-or long-term memories (Ganis et al., 2003; Kosslyn et al., 2001 ). Images 55 generated from memory seem anecdotally weaker, or less vivid, than those evoked by 56 sensory input, yet also appear to rely on the visual system (Dijkstra et al., 2018) . In line with 57 this, current theories of mental imagery involve common mechanisms for human vision and 58 mental imagery. 59
Recent work has revealed overlapping neural substrates for visual perception and 60 imagery. Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 61 and category-selective temporal cortices (Mechelli et al., 2004; Reeder et al., 2015) . 67
Overlapping activation is also present in low-level visual areas, despite the absence of visual 68 input during imagery; imagery and visual perception both activate the lateral geniculate 69 nucleus of the thalamus (LGN) (Chen et al., 1998) and primary visual cortex (V1) ( 
Imagery sequence
160
Each imagery sequence began with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 1000 161 milliseconds. The four stimuli were displayed sequentially in the centre of the screen, within a 162 black border. Each was displayed for 1500 milliseconds each, in a pseudo-random order. 163
Targets were counterbalanced such that each block contained all 24 possible sequences of 164 the four stimuli. For each sequence, a different target was selected in each block. Target 165 allocation in each block was also randomised. This counterbalancing meant each image 166 appeared in each temporal position as a target equally often. 167
The fourth stimulus was followed by a 1000ms fixation cross, then a numerical cue 168 appeared (1-4). This cue referred to the target's position in the stream; for example, '3' 169 indicated the target was the third image in the stream. Participants were instructed to click the 170 mouse once they had identified the target and were mentally "projecting an image into the 171 square". Upon clicking, the number was replaced with a dark grey fixation cross and the frame 172 was filled light grey. This 'imagery' screen was displayed for 3000ms before automatically 173 advancing to a response screen. On the response screen, participants were shown the four 174 stimuli and horizontal mirror images of these stimuli. They used a mouse to select which of 175 these images they were imagining. Mirror images were used as distractors because they are 176 semantically identical but visually different, to determine if participants were using a semantic 177 strategy rather than an imagery-based strategy. Horizontal positioning changed across blocks 178 (stimulus identity), and vertical positioning was randomised every trial (mirror images/stimulus) 179 such that for some trials the mirror image was in the top row, and some in the bottom row. 180
This randomisation aimed to reduce predictability in responses. Data were down-sampled to 250Hz to reduce computational load, then filtered using a 0.1Hz 215 high-pass filter, and a 100Hz low-pass filter. Line noise at 50Hz was removed using the 216 Fig S2) , we expected the period 224 immediately following the cue to provide insight into the initial stages of imagery generation. 225
226
Decoding analysis 227
All EEG analyses were performed using time-resolved decoding methods, custom-written 228 using CoSMoMVPA functions in MATLAB (Oosterhof et al., 2016) . For all decoding analyses, 229 a regularised linear discriminant classifier (as implemented in CoSMoMVPA) was trained to 230 differentiate brain patterns evoked by each image or category of images. 231
For category decoding, a classifier was trained to distinguish images of Santa from 232 images of the Sydney Harbour Bridge for recordings from the same type (i.e., a classifier 233 trained on data from the Pattern Estimator was tested on another independent portion of the 234 Pattern Estimator data). To determine if exemplars were also uniquely represented, a classifier 235 was trained to distinguish between the two exemplars within each category (e.g., decode the 236 10 two Santa images). Classifiers were trained and tested for each time point using a 12ms sliding 237 time window (three time points). 238
To analyse data from the Pattern Estimator and Vision epochs, each presentation 239 sequence was treated as independent. We used a leave-one-trial-out cross-validation 240 approach, where Vision trials were composed of the four stimuli in each imagery sequence 241
and 
Results
259
In this experiment, participants viewed rapid streams of images (Pattern Estimator), and 260 series of imagery trials. In imagery trials, participants were presented with a sequence of four 261 images (Vision) and then were cued to imagine one of the images (Imagery). We trained and 262 tested multivariate classifiers to decode exemplar and category of the object in all three The distribution of overall scores is shown in Supplementary Figure S1 . 273
Target identification
274
To verify if participants were able to identify the target for imagery trials correctly, we 275 examined their behavioural responses after each imagery sequence. Participants were able 276 to accurately identify the target, with an average overall accuracy of 92% (SD = 4.40). Of 277 the trials which were errors, most participants chose one of the four original images (67% of 278
errors). Approximately a third of incorrect responses were to the flipped version of the target. 279
This suggests participants successfully learned the basic characteristics of the target images 280 and were not simply relying on a mnemonic strategy to complete the task. The mean 281 response time from cue to imagery was 3.21 seconds (SD = 1.86) and the most frequent 282 response time was between 1.5 and 2 seconds (Supplementary Fig S2) . 283 To test whether category information was represented in visually displayed images, we 287 trained and tested a classifier on the images seen during experimental trials (Vision). 288
EEG results
284
Significant decoding of image category and exemplars for seen
Category decoding was continuously above chance (ps < .05) after 88ms (Fig 1), indicating  289 patterns of brain activity for Santas and Sydney Harbour Bridges were distinguishable from 290 this point. This above-chance decoding was sustained for the entire time the image was 291 displayed. Continuous above-chance decoding began for both Santas and Sydney Harbour 292
Bridges at 96ms. Peak accuracy occurred at 132ms for Santas, 124ms for Sydney Harbour 293
Bridges and at 196ms for category decoding. 
Significant category decoding in Pattern Estimator
296
To create a category classification model for imagery, we looked at patterns of brain 297 activity while participants were viewing images in the fast stream (Pattern Estimator). All 298 images were labelled according to super-ordinate categories of 'face' or 'place'. To assess 299 the model's utility, we cross-validated it on the Pattern Estimator trials. There was sustained 300 above-chance category decoding from 124ms after stimulus onset until approximately 301 535ms after stimulus onset (Fig 1) . The classifier was also able to distinguish between the 302 two Sydney Harbour Bridge targets at several discrete time points between 236ms and 303 348ms after stimulus onset. There was no continuous above-chance decoding for Santas. 304
Category decoding peaked at 404ms after stimulus onset, at 244ms for Sydney Harbour 305
Bridges, and at 120ms for Santas. 306
No significant decoding for imagery
307
To determine if category or exemplar information was decodable from imagined data, 308
we trained and tested a classifier on the Cue-and Response-Locked Imagined epochs (Fig  309   2 ). Brain areas activated during imagery are known to vary between individuals (Cui et al., 310 2007), so we looked at imagery decoding on an individual subject basis. For each subject, 311
we ran a permutation test in which the decoding procedure was run 1000 times, with 312 category labels randomly assigned to the epochs. A p-value was calculated for each time 313 point, based on the number of permutations with a greater decoding accuracy than the 314 correct label decoding. We used the False Discovery Rate to correct for multiple 315 comparisons. This test was conducted on both Response-and Cue-Locked epochs, and we 316 found decoding was not significantly above chance for any individual at any time point for 317
either Cue-or Response-Locked data (ps > .05). 
Differences in vividness did not affect decoding accuracy 338
Another possibility is that people with greater capacity for imagery have more decodable 339 imagery representations. To investigate the effects of subjective imagery vividness on 340 decoding accuracy, we grouped the participants as 'high' or 'low' imagery vividness based 341 on a median split of their 'eyes-open' scores in the VVIQ. Two participants had the median 342 score and were excluded from further analysis. We used the eyes-open score because it 343 was the most relevant for the task at hand, and makes our results comparable to prior MEG 344 research (Dijkstra et al., 2018) , where only the eyes-open section was used. To see if there 345 were any significant differences between the groups in any of the previously described 346 analyses, we conducted a random-effects Monte Carlo statistic with 10,000 iterations to find 347 where differences between the groups were significantly greater than zero. There was only 348 one isolated point of significant differences between the two conditions, at 1484ms, when 349 the classifier was trained on Pattern Estimator data and tested on Response-Locked 350
Imagery. 351
Discussion
352
The current study used time-series decoding to capture the precise temporal 353 fluctuations underlying mental imagery. Based on prior MEG evidence showing the category 354 and identity of imagined objects can be decoded, we expected successful category and 355 exemplar decoding from imagery. However, contrary to our predictions, we were unable to 356 detect any systematic representations of category or exemplar information during imagery. 357
Based on previous evidence that imagery recruits similar neural networks to vision (Ganis 358 et al., 2004) , we also anticipated overlapping patterns of neural activity when participants 359 were viewing and imagining the same image. Although we were able to decode stimulus 360 category and identity from visually processed stimuli, there were no time points where neural 361 representations of vision and imagery were overlapping. Finally, we considered whether 362 individual subject results might vary on the basis of imagery vividness, and found no 363 systematic differences between subjects reporting high and low vividness. Overall, our 364 findings demonstrate the variability of imagery processes within subjects over time, and 365 suggest stimulus-and design-related factors may influence the chances of successfully 366 decoding mental imagery. 367
To compare the overlap between imagery and visual processing, we first defined 368 the temporal dynamics of visual processing for the images in this experiment. For stimuli 369 presented as part of the imagery sequence (Vision), image category was predictable from 370 approximately 100ms after stimulus presentation until offset 1400ms later. Exemplar 371 decoding was also significant from 100ms, albeit for less continuous time than category 372 decoding, reflecting well-established evidence that both categories and exemplars evoke 373 distinct patterns of brain activity (Carlson et al., 2013) . For the Pattern Estimator, category 374 decoding was significantly higher than chance from 100ms until approximately 500ms after 375 stimulus onset. This extended period of decoding after stimulus offset supports recent 376 18 evidence that multiple representations can co-exist in the brain (Grootswagers et al., 2019 ; 377
Marti and Dehaene, 2017). 378
In both visual conditions, exemplar decoding peaked earlier than category decoding. When the classifier trained on the visual stimuli was tested on imagery, there were no 388 time points where the signal was sufficiently similar to accurately predict image category or 389 identity. To investigate the possibility that the processes were not temporally aligned, we 390 conducted a temporal generalisation analysis. There were no regular patterns of activity at 391 the group level, indicating there was no overlap in representations at any point in the imagery 392 period. Based on evidence that areas of activation during imagery vary across people (e.g., 393
Cui et al., 2007), we examined results on the individual level. Patterns of individual decoding 394 accuracy varied dramatically between subjects. Neither category nor exemplar decoding 395 was significant at any time point for any individual. At face value, these results seem 396 inconsistent with prior findings by Dijkstra and colleagues (Dijkstra et al., 2018) . These 397 differences primarily point to the difficulties of studying visual mental imagery, and the 398 specific methodological characteristics required to obtain significant imagery decoding. 
